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Determination 
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Abstract: The structures of protein and DNA were discovered primarily by means of 
synthesizing component-level information about bond types, lengths, and angles, rather than 
analyzing X-ray diffraction photographs of these molecules. In this paper, I consider the 
synthetic and analytic approaches to exemplify alternative heuristics for approaching mid-
twentieth-century macromolecular structure determination. I argue that the former was, all 
else being equal, likeliest to generate the correct structure in the shortest period of time. I 
begin by characterizing problem solving in these cases as proceeding via the elimination of 
candidate structures through the successive application of component-level information and 
interpretations of X-ray diffraction photographs, each of which serves as a kind of constraint 
on structure. Then, I argue that although each kind of constraint enables the elimination of a 
considerable proportion of candidate structures, component-level constraints are significantly 
more likely to do so correctly. Thus, considering them before X-ray diffraction photographs 
is a better heuristic than one that reverses this order. Because the synthetic approach that 
resulted in the determination of the protein and DNA structures exemplifies such a heuristic, 
its use can help account for these discoveries. 
 
1. Introduction 
Within a few years in the mid-twentieth century, Linus Pauling1 determined the 
structure of protein and Watson and Crick discovered the structure of DNA. In both cases, the 
eventual discoverers of these structures competed with rival groups in other labs. And in both 
cases, the discoverers and their rivals approached the problem differently. Pauling, together 
with collaborator Robert Corey, adopted a bottom-up, compositional approach:2 he took what 
he knew about different structural components of protein – bond types,3 lengths, and angles 
between atoms in the polypeptide chain – and used these as puzzle pieces, so to speak, from 
																																																						
1 More precisely, Pauling discovered one way in which a chain of amino acids can fold in three dimensions, 
what we refer to as the secondary structure of protein. The nature of the problem of protein structure that 
Pauling solved is discussed in Section 2. 
2‘Bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ are here used in the information processing sense: as will become clear, I am not 
drawing on the distinction between theory and data, but between building up a whole from component parts and 
breaking it down. 
3 In this case, whether they were single or double bonds. 
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which the three-dimensional structure could be built up (Judson 1996, p. 62). Inspired by 
Pauling’s success, Watson and Crick adopted a similar strategy, constructing three-
dimensional models from structural features of DNA. Their rivals, Sir Lawrence Bragg, John 
Kendrew, and Max Perutz in the case of protein and Rosalind Franklin in the case of DNA,4 
instead adopted a top-down, decompositional approach: rather than attempting to synthesize 
information about what was known about the individual components of the molecules, these 
groups instead analyzed X-ray diffraction photographs of the molecules in question.  
One might ask, to what extent was this difference in approach responsible for the 
eventual successes of the discoverers in each case? Although I will propose an answer to this 
question, this will be only my secondary aim. My primary aim will be to address a related set 
of issues. Suppose a beginning graduate student wishing to work on the structure of one of 
these macromolecules were selecting between labs to join. Which should she choose? Or 
suppose a granting agency were attempting to determine which research project to fund. 
Which is most promising? The driving question: given the state of scientific knowledge and 
technology at the time, which of these approaches – the synthetic one championed by Pauling 
and Watson and Crick, or the analytic one favoured by Bragg’s group and Franklin – had the 
greatest likelihood of finding the molecular structure in question in the shortest period of 
time?  
This is a question about heuristics, problem-solving guidelines or “rules of thumb.” 
There is no algorithm for solving complex scientific problems like those of protein and DNA 
structure. Scientists do not have a set of instructions that, if precisely followed, will lead them 
to the correct structure. Rather, a degree of trial and error is involved. Scientists follow 
promising leads and make false starts; they propose and abandon various hypotheses. The 
process is messy, yet not directionless: it is guided by some overarching principles, even if 
scientists deviate from them from time to time. So to say, for instance, that one has followed 
the heuristic of the synthetic approach, one need not have considered all component-level 
considerations before looking at X-ray diffraction photographs. Rather, one follows the 
heuristic so long as one in general considers such constraints first. Thus, Pauling can be 
understood as having followed the heuristic even if, as we will see in Section 4, he went back 
and forth between reasoning from known structural components of protein and X-ray 
diffraction photographs to some extent.  
																																																						
4 Pauling also worked on the structure of DNA, but only intermittently. He was more focused on other projects, 
and the three-stranded model he eventually came up with was a rather hurried effort. We will not consider it 
here. 
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Wimsatt (2006, pp. 464–65) identifies several important properties of heuristics, four 
of which will be particularly relevant for what follows. First, although heuristics might 
increase the likelihood of success, they do not guarantee it, in contrast to truth-preserving 
algorithms, which guarantee the truth of the conclusion given the truth of the premises. This 
is in part because heuristics impose far fewer restrictions on how one should proceed, and 
therefore even if one adopts the best possible heuristic, other factors can affect whether or not 
one succeeds. Second, heuristics are “cost-effective…in terms of demands on memory, 
computation, or other limited resources” (Wimsatt 2006, p. 465, emphasis original). Third, 
applying a heuristic to a particular problem amounts to transforming that problem into a non-
equivalent, but related problem. Thus, when a problem is solved using a heuristic, there 
remains the question of whether it is appropriate to consider the solution to the transformed 
problem to also be a solution to the original problem. Finally, heuristics are purpose-relative; 
that is, they are useful for certain aims, but not others. 
 Which heuristic was best for approaching the problem of determining the structure of 
a complex macromolecule such as protein or DNA in the mid-twentieth century? In 
particular, which was likeliest to be the most “cost-effective” in the sense of the second 
property above? In order to answer these questions, let us begin by characterizing different 
pieces of empirical evidence and theoretical considerations as constraints on molecular 
structure: in order to be considered acceptable, a structure must accord with or account for 
each such piece of evidence and theory. We may then characterize the synthetic and analytic 
approaches as differing with respect to the order in which different constraints on structure 
are taken into account. The synthetic approach can be understood as beginning by taking into 
account information about bond types, lengths, and angles, considering X-ray diffraction 
photographs of the molecule in question only afterwards, while the analytic approach can be 
regarded as reversing this order, deriving what can be known from such X-ray diffraction 
photographs first, and then comparing that with information about bond types, lengths, and 
angles.  
The order in which different considerations, particularly pieces of empirical evidence, 
are considered is not usually taken to have any bearing on the outcome of an investigation. 
Indeed, Bayesians assume that an adequate model of updating beliefs ought to be 
commutative, i.e. updating on evidence A before evidence B should produce the same degree 
of confirmation as updating on B before A, and a common criticism of Jeffrey 
Conditionalization is that it fails to meet this requirement (cf. Domotor, 1980; Doring, 1999; 
Field, 1978; Skyrms, 1986; van Fraassen, 1989). But the view that the order in which 
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evidence is consulted should not affect the outcome of an investigation rests on the 
assumption that the time available for its completion is infinite. In practice, of course, this is 
not the case.5 Research is often driven by competition between groups, and in order to make a 
discovery at all, one must make it first, beating one’s rival to it. In actual scientific practice, 
speed and efficiency matter. 
I will argue that the order in which different constraints are taken into account affects 
how quickly or efficiently a problem is likely to be solved, thereby contributing to the “cost-
effectiveness” of a heuristic. My goal is to demonstrate not only that this order matters, but 
also to explain why it does. In order to do so, we may understand the problem of molecular 
structure determination as beginning with a space of candidate structures, each a possible 
solution to the problem, the size of which is reduced through the consideration of various 
constraints, thereby transforming the original problem into a related problem, in accordance 
with the third property of heuristics above.6 The consideration of a particular constraint 
requires its application to the problem, which can involve interpretation: what does it tell us 
about which solutions are possible? As we will see, such an understanding of the problem 
enables us to estimate what I will call the average informativeness of a constraint, a function 
of two variables: (i) the extent to which its application reduces the size of the possibility 
space, leaving fewer structures for further consideration, and (ii) how confident scientists 
could be that they had correctly applied the constraint, that is, eliminated only incorrect 
structures through its application. 
Developing an understanding of how to select between heuristics is significant for 
two reasons. First, scientists often make decisions about how to approach complex problems 
in the face of various kinds of uncertainties: about the truth, accuracy, or instrumental value 
of relevant theories and models, about the feasibility and applicability of experimental 
procedures, and about the reliability of instruments and interpretation of results, not to 
mention other social and pragmatic factors. These decisions are far from straightforward. 
Thus, an analysis of how to approach them is valuable in its own right. However, such an 
analysis can also shed new light on two well-known historical cases, providing at least a 
																																																						
5 There is a longstanding debate about how much evidence scientists should collect, given a finite amount of 
time for an investigation, and what the relationship is between this and the ideal limit of what they should do 
given an infinite amount of time. See Heesen (2015) for a review of the literature and original proposal. The 
question I address in this paper is different. I assume the availability of a common set of constraints on structure 
and ask how the order in which different kinds of constraints from that set are consulted affects how quickly the 
investigation can be concluded. 
6 In a similar vein, Craver (2007, Ch. 7) characterizes the process of determining mechanistic explanations in 
neuroscience as eliminating possible explanations. 
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tentative answer to the question of how a difference in approach might have contributed to 
the successes of the discoveries of the protein and DNA structures. I will argue that, to the 
extent that the problems and approaches to solving them adopted by the historical actors 
reflect the transformed problems and heuristics that will be the focus of this paper, we ought 
to accept the answer to the question of which heuristic was best as also explaining – perhaps 
only partially, and in conjunction with other proposals – the successes of the groups that 
made the discoveries. And I will further argue that there is, indeed, significant overlap 
between the idealized problems and heuristics I describe here and the approaches adopted by 
the different groups in these cases. 
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin by introducing the problems of protein and 
DNA structure as they stood in the mid-twentieth century, describing the ways in which 
different theoretical and empirical considerations constrained which structures were 
permissible. I show that the process of structure determination may be understood as 
proceeding via the successive elimination of candidate structures, with each constraint 
dictating which structures are to be eliminated (Section 2). Then, I introduce the notion of 
average informativeness. I argue that the best heuristic is the one that considers the most 
informative constraint first (Section 3). I show that, in our case studies, component-level 
constraints concerning bond types, distances, and angles were more informative than whole-
molecule X-ray diffraction photographs, so taking the former into account before the latter 
was most likely to yield the correct structure first (Section 4). I discuss the extent to which 
the transformed problem of molecular structure determination reflects the actual problem 
(Section 5), and conclude by suggesting that Pauling’s and Watson and Crick’s having 
followed this heuristic can help account for their discoveries of the protein and DNA 
structures respectively (Section 6). 
 
2. The transformed problem: reducing the space of structural possibilities by applying 
constraints on structure 
The mid-twentieth-century problems of protein and DNA structure were to determine 
how one or more chains of molecular subunits folded in three dimensions. In the case of 
protein, the subunits in question were amino acids, each with the same basic structure but 
differentiated from one another by unique R groups. Strings of amino acids were known to be 
connected by peptide bonds into polypeptide chains (Figure 1). In the case of DNA, the 
subunits were nucleotides, each made up of a phosphate group, the sugar deoxyribose, and 
one of four bases: adenine, guanine, cytosine, or thymine. The sugar–phosphate chains they 
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formed had directionality in the sense that they had two distinct ends, known as the 3' and 5' 
ends (Figure 2). The problem was to determine how many such chains DNA contained, how 
they were oriented with respect to one another, and how the molecule folded in three 
dimensions.  
 
                       
Figure 1. The structure of a polypeptide chain, with the R groups corresponding to different amino acids and 
peptide bonds indicated. The problem of protein structure was to determine how polypeptide chains folded in 
three dimensions. 
                                    
Figure 2. A sugar-phosphate chain with 3' and 5' ends labeled. 
 
In each case, the problem may be characterized as follows. One begins with a space of 
possible structures, defined by what was known about the molecule. In the case of protein, 
the set of candidate structures was composed of the various ways the polypeptide chain might 
fold – its possible conformations. In the case of DNA, this set was larger, consisting of the 
various possible permutations of two or three sugar–phosphate chains, arranged in parallel or 
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anti-parallel, with the bases on the inside or outside of the molecule, and again all of the 
possible ways in which the molecule could fold. The size of this space is initially very large, 
since bond lengths and angles could be varied continuously and variously combined with one 
another.7 It may be reduced through the consideration of different constraints on structure, 
bits of information about bond types, lengths, and angles and X-ray diffraction photographs 
of the molecule.  
How such reductions of the possibility space take place depends on the type of 
constraint under consideration. Let us consider each in turn. To see how information about 
bond types, lengths, and angles constrains structure, enabling the successive reduction of the 
size of the possibility space, let us consider a simplified example. Suppose that we are trying 
to determine the structure of formamide, and we know it to have the following structural 
formula:  
 
 
 
Suppose that we also know the bond angles and distances between the atoms in formamide. 
We may use these as constraints enabling the successive elimination of candidate structures 
as follows. Prior to the application of a constraint, very many structures are possible, since 
each of the bond lengths and angles in the molecule can take on any value. If we apply the 
information that the C–N bond distance is 1.34 Å, we may eliminate candidate structures 
with C–N bond distances other than 1.34 Å from further consideration.8 If we then consider 
the fact that the C=O bond distance is 1.24 Å, we may again eliminate further structures from 
the possibility space, leaving only those with 1.34-Å C–N and 1.24-Å C=O bond distances. 
We may continue in this fashion, thereby fixing the bond distances in the molecule. 
Similarly, applying bond angles as constraints enables us to eliminate any structures that do 
not conform with them. Finally, bond types also constrain structure in the same way.9 A 
molecule may only rotate about a single bond. Moreover, due to a phenomenon known as 
																																																						
7 If bond lengths and angles are allowed to take on any positive real value, the number of possible structures is 
infinite. The more we restrict permissible values of these variables – for instance, by setting upper and lower 
bounds on bond lengths and discretizing bond lengths and angles – the fewer the initial number of possibilities. 
And, in practice, the possibilities would be so restricted. In any case, the number is very large, and that is all that 
is necessary for the purposes of the argument in this paper. 
8 This example is adapted from Pauling’s Nature of the Chemical Bond (1960, pp. 281–82). 
9 Bond type and length are, of course, related. For instance, single bonds are longer than double bonds. I 
separate them here because they provide different sorts of constraints on structure. 
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resonance, some bonds that are depicted in structural formulae as single bonds in fact have 
partial double-bond character. The peptide bond in formamide – the same bond that joins 
amino acids together to form a polypeptide chain – is an instance of such a bond: an electron 
from the C=O bond spends some of its time at the C–N bond. Thus, rotation about the 
peptide bond is also prohibited. Upon taking each component-level constraint into 
consideration, successively narrowing down the space of possible structures, we are left with 
only one, the planar molecular structure of formamide.  
Let us now turn to the way in which X-ray diffraction photographs of a molecule 
constrain the space of possible structures. X-ray diffraction photographs are produced by 
shining a beam of X-rays through a regular lattice with repeating subcomponents, such as a 
crystallized long-chain molecule. The electron clouds of the atoms in the molecule scatter X-
rays, producing a diffraction pattern on a photographic plate. The locations and intensities of 
spots on a photograph form a reciprocal lattice, which contains information about the 
amplitude of the X-rays. However, in order to determine atomic positions from these 
photographs, not only the amplitude but also the phase of the X-rays is required. Thus, the 
photographs contain only partial information about structure. This is known as the phase 
problem.  
Thus, in order to use X-ray diffraction photographs as constraints on structure, one 
had to first interpret them to determine what structural information they provided. This 
should be borne in mind in the following illustrations, and will be important in the discussion 
in Section 4. At the University of Leeds, crystallographer William Astbury produced 
numerous X-ray diffraction photographs that would figure crucially in the determination of 
the protein and DNA structures. In the 1930s, he showed that there were two forms of 
keratin, a protein that makes up wool, fingernails, and hair: unstretched (which he named 
‘alpha’ keratin) and stretched (‘beta’) keratin. A characteristic spot in Astbury’s photographs 
was taken to indicate that alpha keratin had a subunit that repeated every 5.1 Å (Figure 3).10 
Taking this spot into consideration constrained protein structure in the sense that it enabled 
one to eliminate any structure lacking such a repeating subunit from the space of possibilities. 
Similarly, Astbury’s photo of DNA, taken before the war and published in 1947, was taken to 
show that DNA contained a monotonous repetition of the four nucleotides with 3.4 Å 
																																																						
10 Although Perutz and Kendrew, at Bragg’s lab, also performed diffraction studies of the proteins hemoglobin 
and myoglobin, Astbury’s photographs were most widely influential, since keratin is a much simpler molecule 
and thus yielded clearer diffraction images. 
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between each, that it had a large structural repeat every 27 Å, and that the sugar component 
was parallel to the flat bases. Again, this photo would constrain DNA structure by 
eliminating from the space of possibilities structures that did not contain these features. 
Finally, as is well known, Franklin also produced a great number of clear diffraction 
photographs of DNA. Her most significant finding was that DNA could take on one of two 
discrete forms: a crystalline ‘A’ form, or a wet ‘B’ form. Franklin discovered that the DNA 
sample in Astbury’s photo was a mixture of the two forms. By the spring of 1952, she had a 
number of very clear images of both the A and B forms (Figure 5). The distinct ‘X’ pattern in 
the photo of the B form suggested a helical conformation for DNA, enabling the elimination 
of non-helical structures from the space of possibilities.  
 
  
Figure 3. One of Astbury’s X-ray diffraction photographs of keratin. Reproduced from Astbury & Street 
(1930). 
 
Figure 4. Astbury’s X-ray diffraction photograph of DNA. Reproduced from Astbury (1947). 
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Figure 5. Examples of Franklin’s diffraction photos of the A form (left) and the B form (right). Reproduced 
from Franklin and Gosling (1953). 
 
We have seen how both component-level information about bond types, lengths, and 
angles and whole-molecule X-ray diffraction photographs may constrain molecular structure 
by enabling the successive elimination of candidate structures incompatible with them from 
the possibility space. If one’s aim is to determine the correct structure of a molecule as 
quickly as possible, one ought to reduce the size of the possibility space as much as possible 
with each constraint one considers. Thus, if one had full confidence in one’s interpretation of 
each constraint – and hence also in the reduction of the possibility space resulting from its 
consideration – then those constraints that eliminate the greatest number of structural 
candidates, leaving the fewest remaining for further consideration, ought to be taken into 
account first.  
But in scientific practice, one may never have full confidence in one’s interpretation; 
at best, one may hold a high degree of belief that it is correct. So a ‘cost-effective’ heuristic 
must not only maximize how many structural candidates are eliminated with each constraint; 
it must also maximize the degree to which scientists can be confident they have eliminated 
only those structures that are incorrect through its application. For if the application of a 
constraint mistakenly eliminates the correct structure, removing it from the space of 
possibilities remaining for further consideration, one will be led astray, and might end up 
having to backtrack or start the process again. This is precisely what happened to Bragg, 
Kendrew, and Perutz. In a paper published in the spring of 1950, they considered twenty 
candidate structures for alpha keratin, and selected from among them the one they thought 
most likely to be correct on the basis that it that best accounted for Astbury’s 5.1-Å spot 
(Bragg, Kendrew & Perutz, 1950), eliminating a structure that was fairly similar to the alpha 
helix, the correct structure eventually discovered by Pauling (Olby, 1974, pp. 289–90). Thus, 
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scientists ought to begin by considering those constraints that eliminate the greatest number 
of candidate structures with the greatest certainty.  
But things are not always so simple, since those constraints that eliminate the greatest 
number of structural candidates may not be those in which scientists have the greatest 
confidence. It may be the case that a given constraint eliminates many possibilities, but 
scientists are not very certain that it is correct. Alternatively, they might be reasonably 
confident in a particular constraint that eliminates very few possibilities. So how ought they 
determine the order in which to apply different constraints?  
 
3. An (abstract) heuristic: weighing confidence in correct constraint application against 
degree of possibility space reduction  
I will argue that scientists must weigh the number of structural possibilities that the 
application of a given constraint eliminates against how certain they can be that it has 
eliminated only incorrect ones. I will begin by describing the game Twenty Questions and 
discussing the order in which questions ought to be asked in this game to maximize one’s 
chances of winning (Section 3.1). Then, I will argue that playing Twenty Questions is 
importantly analogous to the process of protein and DNA structure determination, so we can 
apply some of what we know about the former case to the latter (Section 3.2). 
 
3.1 A heuristic for Twenty Questions 
In the game Twenty Questions, one player brings to mind some entity or being – let 
us call it the ‘object of inquiry’ – and the other tries to guess what it is by asking a series of 
yes-or-no questions. Since the maximum number of questions permitted is twenty, the goal is 
to reveal the identity of the object of inquiry by asking as few questions as possible. What is 
the best question to ask at each stage in Twenty Questions? Suppose we have reached a stage 
in the game where we know that the object of inquiry is a whole number between 1 and 100. 
In this case, there are one hundred possible answers left. Consider three candidates for the 
next question: 
 
Q1.  Is the number 1? 
Q2.  Is it greater than 80? 
Q3.  Is it even? 
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Asking Q1 carves out the remaining possibilities into groups of one and ninety-nine. If the 
answer is ‘Yes’, we are left with only one possibility and the game is over, whereas ‘No’ 
leaves us with ninety-nine remaining for further consideration. Thus, the probability that only 
one out of one hundred possibilities will be eliminated is 0.99, whereas the probability that 
ninety-nine possibilities will be eliminated is 0.01. Asking Q2 divides remaining possibilities 
into groups of twenty (if the answer is ‘Yes’) and eighty (if the answer is ‘No’); the 
probabilities that twenty and eighty possibilities will be eliminated are 0.8 and 0.2 
respectively. Finally, asking Q3 divides the possibility space in half: fifty possibilities for 
‘Yes’, fifty for ‘No’. Thus, the probability that fifty possibilities will be eliminated is 1. 
The best heuristic for playing Twenty Questions is to ask questions like Q3, those that 
divide the possibility space in half, or as close to half as possible. Although we might get 
lucky in asking Q1 and get the right answer in just one question on some particular play of 
the game, this would happen rarely. At earlier stages in the game, getting the right answer by 
asking questions like Q1 would be even more rare: if we had determined only that the object 
of inquiry was a whole number between one and a thousand, we would have a 0.001% 
chance of guessing its identity in just one question. This probability would be even lower if 
we only knew that the object of inquiry was a whole number, or if we did not know that it 
was a number at all. 
Q3 is a better question than Q2 and especially Q1 because it finds the best balance 
between how many possibilities might be eliminated and how certain one can be that this 
many possibilities will in fact be eliminated. That is, on average, Q3 eliminates more 
possibilities than Q2 or Q1. We can be reasonably certain, for instance, that the answer to Q1 
will be ‘No’ because the probability that the answer will be ‘No’ is 0.99. Although we might 
get lucky if the object of inquiry is 1, on average, we do not learn much by asking Q1: 
usually, we just learn that the number is not 1, eliminating only one of one hundred 
possibilities. So we should ask questions like Q3 first, asking questions like Q1 and Q2 only 
in later stages of the game. 
 
3.2 Twenty Questions and molecular structure determination 
There are several similarities between playing Twenty Questions and determining 
protein or DNA structure. First, the best heuristic for both is whichever one most reliably 
finds the shortest route to success: in Twenty Questions, the one that minimizes the number 
of questions that must be asked to determine the identity of the object of inquiry, and in the 
process of molecular structure determination, the one that minimizes the number of 
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inferential steps required to find the correct structure. Second, just as different considerations 
in our case study act as constraints on molecular structure, so too do question-answer pairs in 
Twenty Questions, suggesting possible identities for the object of inquiry while eliminating 
others. Finally, both Twenty Questions and molecular structure determination involve some 
degree of uncertainty at each step: the answer to a question cannot be predicted, and one 
cannot know whether one’s application of a constraint to eliminate particular candidate 
structures is correct.  
However, while both Twenty Questions and the process of molecular structure 
determination involve some degree of uncertainty at each step, the nature of this uncertainty 
is different in each case. In Twenty Questions, a player cannot predict what the answer to a 
question will be. As we saw in the last section, her uncertainty is precisely quantifiable: the 
probability of each answer is the proportion of possibilities remaining in the possibility space 
that are compatible with that answer. In contrast, the uncertainty in the process of molecular 
structure determination resides in scientists’ not knowing whether a given application of a 
constraint is correct, and thus not knowing whether the correct structure does, indeed, lie in 
the space of possible structures remaining for further consideration. In Twenty Questions, a 
player is uncertain how much the space of possible structures will be reduced when a 
question is asked; but once she receives the answer, her uncertainty is dissolved, and she is 
left with a new, definite possibility space that helps her decide which question to ask next. In 
the case of molecular structure determination, the uncertainty in a scientist’s application of a 
constraint remains once that application has been made. Moreover, it ‘infects’ the remainder 
of the process in the sense that if the application is incorrect, subsequent reasoning about the 
structure is led astray. 
Although the kind of uncertainty inherent in applications of constraints in the case of 
protein structure determination is different from that which exists upon asking a question in 
Twenty Questions, both kinds of uncertainty have the same effect: they detract from the 
efficiency of the process at hand. Thus, in both cases, one has an imperative to reduce this 
uncertainty as much as possible. In fact, this imperative is greater for the process of 
molecular structure determination, since the kind of uncertainty present there has the 
potential to lead scientists off course, putting them at risk of having to backtrack and 
determine where they went wrong. Such a costly error is simply not possible in Twenty 
Questions. Moreover, the detractions from the efficiency of the process that both 
contributions make are similar in degree. By asking questions like “Is the number 1?” at each 
stage, a player is highly unlikely to guess the identity of the object of inquiry in just twenty 
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questions; similarly, by applying constraints in a way that is unlikely to be correct, one 
probably will not determine the correct structure of protein or DNA in a timely manner.  
Despite this difference in kinds of uncertainty, important features of the analogy 
between Twenty Questions and the process of molecular structure determination are 
preserved: maximizing the number of possibilities eliminated with each step contributes to 
the efficiency of the process, as does minimizing the amount of uncertainty present at each 
juncture. We may capture these features using what I will call average informativeness, or 
simply informativeness for short, to determine the order in which to consider different 
constraints.11 The informativeness of constraint is a function of (i) the extent to which its 
application reduces the size of the possibility space and (ii) the extent to which scientists 
were warranted in believing that the application is correct. Although (i) and (ii) cannot be 
precisely quantified, as I will show in the next section, their relative values can nonetheless 
be estimated. So just as the best heuristic for Twenty Questions is to ask questions that reduce 
the space of possible answers with the greatest certainty each time, the best heuristic for 
determining protein or DNA structure, other things being equal, is to consider the most 
informative constraint at each stage.12  
 
4. A (concrete) heuristic: average informativeness of constraints on molecular structure 
In the last section, I introduced an abstract heuristic for determining molecular 
structure: different constraints should be applied in order of decreasing informativeness, 
where informativeness is a function of the extent to which the application of a constraint 
reduces the size of the space of possible structures and how confident scientists could be that 
this application is correct. In this section, I will argue that component-level constraints were, 
in this sense, more informative than X-ray diffraction photographs of the molecule in the 
cases of protein and DNA structure determination: although both kinds of constraints enabled 
the elimination of a considerable proportion of the possibility space, the confidence that 
scientists were warranted in having in their applications of component-level constraints 
significantly outweighed the confidence they were warranted in having in their interpretations 
of X-ray diffraction photographs. Thus, the best (concrete) heuristic for molecular structure 
determination in these cases was to apply component-level constraints to eliminate possible 
																																																						
11 Average informativeness is inspired by (but not identical to)	the notion of informational entropy, a measure 
for average amount of information, which originated in Claude Shannon’s (1948) mathematical theory of 
communication.	
12 Discussion of this ceteris paribus clause follows in Section 5. It will henceforth generally be omitted for the 
sake for brevity. 
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structures first, only afterwards eliminating further structures using interpretations of X-ray 
diffraction photographs. 
Let us consider each of the factors that contribute to the informativeness of a 
constraint in turn, beginning with the extent to which its application enables a reduction of 
the size of the possibility space. To approximate the extent to which the application of a 
component-level constraint reduces the size of the possibility space, consider again the 
example of determining the structure of formamide (Section 2). Applying the constraint of 
the 1.34-Å C–N bond distance eliminated fewer than, say, a tenth of the possibilities. For 
even once we fix the C–N bond distance, our possibility space still includes structural 
candidates with any bond angles and distances for all of the other bonds in the molecule. On 
the other hand, Astbury’s interpretation of his X-ray diffraction photograph of alpha keratin 
certainly eliminated more than half, possibly more than three-quarters, of remaining 
possibilities: it reduced the possibility space from including any configuration to only those 
with a repeating subunit every 5.1 Å. 
The proportions of eliminated structures I have here indicated are meant only as first-
pass, rough-and-ready estimates. My aim is merely to show that although the interpretation of 
an X-ray diffraction photograph eliminates a greater proportion of the remaining structures 
than the application of a component-level constraint, the latter is nonetheless able to 
eliminate a significant number of structural possibilities. This is important. If the number of 
structures eliminated by the application of a component-level constraint were sufficiently 
small, it would not matter how confident scientists were in this application; it would be better 
to begin instead by examining those constraints in which they had less confidence but which 
permitted the elimination of a greater number of structural candidates. But the disparity 
between the number of structures eliminated by the application of component-level 
constraints and by interpretation of X-ray diffraction photographs is not quite so great: 
component-level constraints and X-ray diffraction photographs both reduce the size of the 
space of structural candidates remaining for further consideration to a significant degree. 
Let us turn now to the second factor contributing to a constraint’s informativeness. 
How confident could scientists be in their applications of each kind of constraint? That is, 
how certain could they be that, upon the elimination of possibilities through the application of 
a particular constraint, the correct structure remained in the set of structural candidates 
remaining for further consideration? The certainty that one is warranted in having in the 
application of a constraint is a product of at least two considerations: (i) the number of 
competing possibility space reductions compatible with that constraint and (ii) the reliability 
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of the constraint itself. If there are several ways to reduce the possibility space by applying a 
particular constraint, there exists the possibility that one chooses among them incorrectly, 
mistakenly removing the correct structure from further consideration. Similarly, if the 
constraint itself is unreliable, one may also be led astray by eliminating structural possibilities 
on its basis. I will show that, in our case studies, component-level constraints fared far better 
than X-ray diffraction photographs on both these fronts.  
 Each component-level constraint can generally only be applied in one correct way. 
Consider again the example of determining the structure of formamide by applying different 
such constraints in succession. Applying the 1.34-Å C–N bond distance to constrain 
structural possibilities amounts to eliminating any structure that does not have a 1.34-Å C–N 
bond distance; there is no other way to apply this constraint correctly. Similarly, the partial 
double-bond character of the C–N bond necessitated the elimination of any structure 
permitting rotation about this bond. In contrast, every X-ray diffraction photograph is 
compatible with multiple interpretations due to limitations intrinsic to the technology of X-
ray diffraction photography. Recall the phase problem: in order to determine molecular 
structure from an X-ray diffraction photograph, one needs both the amplitude and absolute 
phase of the X-rays that are diffracted by the molecule. But an X-ray diffraction photograph 
only reveals the amplitudes and relative phases of the waves. Thus, each photograph permits 
several interpretations, each compatible with different absolute phases of the rays.  
This brings us to the second factor that contributes to the confidence scientists could 
have in applications of constraints to reduce the size of the possibility space: the reliability of 
(interpretations of) the constraints themselves. Note that this is different from how confident 
scientists could be that they had correctly reduced the size of the possibility space through the 
consideration of each constraint: this second factor expresses the fact that confidence in the 
correct application of a constraint can vary even on the assumption that the constraint itself is 
reliable. I will argue that component-level constraints were more reliable than interpretations 
of X-ray diffraction photographs.  
Interpretations of X-ray diffraction photographs of biological macromolecules were 
relatively unreliable because the photographs tended to be blurry.13 The size and complexity 
of biological macromolecules made them difficult to crystallize, so they often lacked the 
																																																						
13 See, for instance, Astbury’s photos (Figures 3 and 4). In particular, contrast Astbury’s photo of DNA (Figure 
4), which Franklin discovered was of a mixture of the A and B forms, with Franklin’s photos (Figure 5). It is 
important to note that while Astbury’s photos were widely available, Franklin’s were published only in the same 
issue of Nature as Watson and Crick’s structure of DNA. 
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regular structure characteristic of inorganic crystals, which was necessary for the production 
of a crisp X-ray diffraction photograph. At the time, then, it was prudent for scientists to 
approach each interpretation of an X-ray diffraction photograph of such macromolecules with 
a commensurate degree of skepticism. Even if it appeared to be straightforward and 
obviously correct, as was the case with Astbury’s interpretation of the 5.1-Å reflection in his 
photograph of alpha keratin, it was always possible that some other interpretation of the 
photograph could be found. Indeed, this is what eventually happened: Pauling and Crick 
independently discovered that two or more alpha helices could be coiled together like strands 
of a rope. This higher-order structure, dubbed the ‘coiled coil’, was responsible for the spot in 
the diffraction photograph that seemed to indicate a 5.1-Å height for one turn of the helix 
(Judson, 1996). 
In contrast, scientists could have relatively high confidence in component-level 
constraints. Whereas bond distances and angles were also determined by X-ray diffraction 
studies, these studies were conducted on small molecules, such as glycine (Albrecht & Corey, 
1939) and alanine (Levy & Corey, 1941). Due to the simplicity of these molecules, X-ray 
diffraction photographs of them tended to be clearer than photos of complex macromolecules 
such as keratin. Moreover, their simplicity also left less room for alternative possible 
interpretations of their X-ray diffraction photos, like the coiled-coil explanation for the 5.1-Å 
spot in Astbury’s photographs. Finally, many bond distances and angles were further 
validated by subsequent studies. When Pauling was having difficulty finding a structure that 
conformed with Astbury’s X-ray diffraction photographs, he considered the possibility that 
he “was making some unjustified assumption about the structural properties of the 
molecules” (Pauling 1970, p. 1003), i.e. that one of the bond distances or angles in the 
polypeptide chain he was working with was wrong. So he and Corey performed X-ray 
diffraction studies on simple molecules over the next ten years, the results of which only 
verified these bond distances and angles. Thus, by 1948, Pauling was convinced that “there 
was nothing surprising about the dimensions of these molecules,” and that his assumptions 
about the structural properties of the polypeptide chain from 1937 “were to be accepted as 
correct” (Pauling 1970, pp. 1003–4). That is, each additional study on simple molecules lent 
further confirmation to component-level constraints.  
Average informativeness is a product of two factors, and there are differences 
between how component-level constraints and X-ray diffraction photographs perform on 
each. I have argued that although both component-level constraints and X-ray diffraction 
photographs enable the elimination of a considerable proportion of the space of possible 
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structures, scientists were warranted in having much more confidence in the former than in 
the latter. But I have also conceded that X-ray diffraction photographs enable the elimination 
of a greater proportion of the possibility space than do component-level constraints. Thus, 
one might object that since the two factors contributing to informativeness pull in opposite 
directions for each kind of constraint, it is not obvious that the informativeness of 
component-level constraints is higher, as I have here argued.  
Why think that the better performance of component-level constraints on the second 
factor outweighs their poorer performance on the first? Mistakes in constraint application are 
costly, so as long as the numbers of structural candidates eliminated by each kind of 
constraint are sufficiently alike, the constraints that are most highly confirmed should be 
considered first. Only if the disparity between the numbers of candidate structures eliminated 
is very high – say, with one constraint eliminating just a few structures, the other eliminating 
90% of them – might it make sense to consider a less highly confirmed constraint before a 
more highly confirmed one. After all, applying a constraint that eliminates just a few 
structures would not get one much closer to the correct structure, even if the constraint were 
guaranteed to be reliable. On the other hand, if a constraint eliminates 90% of the possibility 
space, one might as well apply it. The payoff of being right is high, and if it turns out one is 
wrong, one would discover so shortly thereafter, and could easily backtrack and start again. 
Thus, we generally ought to choose constraints that eliminate structures with certainty, or as 
close to certainty as possible. And applications of component-level constraints do just this. 
On balance, then, the components-first heuristic was likely to be more efficient than the 
photos-first one. 
 
5. Does the transformed problem reflect the real problem?  
I have characterized the mid-twentieth-century problem of protein structure 
determination as beginning with a space of possible solutions, which may be narrowed down 
through the successive consideration of component-level constraints and whole-molecule X-
ray diffraction photographs. I argued that the constraint selected for consideration at each 
stage ought to be the most informative of those available: it ought to optimize the balance 
between how many possibilities are eliminated upon its application and how likely it is that 
this elimination has been conducted correctly. I showed that, other things being equal, 
component-level constraints were more informative than X-ray diffraction photographs, so 
the components-first heuristic is likely to be most ‘cost-effective’ or efficient. Let us now 
turn to a question raised in Section 1: to what extent does the problem as I have characterized 
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it here reflect the original problems of protein and DNA structure determination? I will show 
that although my characterization introduces several idealizations, their effect on heuristic 
selection is either insignificant, or else it enables the heuristic to be further refined.  
First, I have assumed that constraints are individuated in a particular way, each 
eliminating a unique subset of the space of possible structures. In practice, however, there 
may be several alternative ways to individuate constraints. One may consider two or more of 
them together, for instance, by applying multiple component-level constraints at once to more 
quickly reduce the size of the possibility space. Conversely, one may take a given constraint 
to say less about structure than I have been assuming here. For example, one might extract 
only coarse-grained information from an X-ray diffraction photograph, such as a helical 
structure for keratin, without inferring anything finer-grained, such as the distance between 
repeating subunits. Let us consider each such alternative individuation of constraints in turn. 
The aggregation of multiple component-level constraints strengthens the case for the 
components-first heuristic being most efficient. Recall that a potential worry about my claim 
that component-level constraints are more informative than X-ray diffraction photographs 
was that the greater number of structures eliminated by considering X-ray diffraction 
photographs than by component-level constraints might be sufficient to outweigh the higher 
confidence scientists were warranted in having in these constraints. Upon aggregating 
multiple component-level constraints, the structural candidates remaining for further 
consideration are those lying in the intersection of the spaces delineated by each of the 
constraints considered in isolation. Thus, the more such constraints we aggregate, the greater 
the proportion of the possibility space is eliminated by their consideration, and the more we 
can alleviate this worry. Moreover, the fact that constraints may be aggregated gives us a 
different way to make the point that, other things being equal, component-level constraints 
ought to be considered before X-ray diffraction photographs. Instead of considering the 
informativeness of individual such constraints, we may consider the informativeness of all of 
them taken together, and compare it to the informativeness of all X-ray diffraction 
photographs. Doing this introduces another idealization, since in practice, scientists would 
not always work with one type of constraint independently of the other. But it also enables us 
to see more decisively why the informativeness of component-level constraints is higher than 
that of X-ray diffraction photographs. 
What about the alternative individuation of constraints according to which we extract 
smaller bits of information from X-ray diffraction photographs, for instance, coarse-grained 
information about overall structure and finer-grained information about repeat distance? On 
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such an individuation, it is possible that some of bits of information extracted from X-ray 
diffraction photographs could be more informative than some component-level constraints. 
For instance, the helical structure suggested by the X pattern in Astbury’s photographs was 
relatively highly confirmed: the low resolution of X-ray diffraction photography made it 
easier to extract such information than finer-grained information about bond lengths and 
angles. Nevertheless, if the argument in Section 4 is correct, there would be few such 
instances: most component-level constraints would still be more informative than most (bits 
of information extracted from) X-ray diffraction photographs. 
 Second, and related to the previous point, my argument assumes that there is one 
value of informativeness associated with component-level constraints and another with X-ray 
diffraction photographs, and I have argued that the former is higher than the latter. We may 
de-idealize the problem by considering the informativeness of particular component-level 
constraints and (bits of information extracted from) X-ray diffraction photographs.14 In so 
doing, we may produce a more fine-grained heuristic for molecular structure determination. 
However, and importantly, the coarse grain of the particular heuristic presented here is part of 
what makes it just that – a general guideline for how to approach the problem, from which 
one might deviate when there is good reason to do so, rather than a strict set of rules that 
must be followed without exception. 
 Third, it is worth emphasizing the ceteris paribus clause implicit in a heuristic: other 
things being equal, one ought to consider the most informative constraint at each stage of 
problem solving. But of course other things tend not to be equal. One assumption I have 
made is that the scientists selecting between strategies are equally proficient in reasoning 
with component-level constraints and drawing inferences from X-ray diffraction 
photographs. In reality, however, scientists who are not sufficiently familiar with reasoning 
from component-level constraints are likely to make mistakes when applying them; indeed, 
this is precisely what happened to Bragg, Kendrew, and Perutz. Thus, in some cases, it may 
well be more efficient to consider X-ray diffraction photographs before component-level 
constraints.15   
																																																						
14 We could further de-idealize by including other constraints on structure that I have not considered here. For 
instance, we might also include non-bonding interactions as additional constraints on structure, assigning them 
values of informativeness as outlined in Section 4. 
15 An additional consideration is how much demand on resources is associated with each kind of constraint. 
Since the process of producing and interpreting X-ray diffraction photographs was notoriously difficult and 
time-consuming, thus detracting from efficiency, taking this into consideration would strengthen the case for 
considering component-level constraints first.   
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 With this observation in hand, we may use the notion of average informativeness to 
answer two different questions. First, the one we have been considering: given the state of 
scientific knowledge and technology at the time, which heuristic should a relatively neutral 
party – say, a beginning graduate student not yet embedded in a particular methodology – 
select? But also: which heuristic should a particular historical actor, with a specific set of 
skills and competencies, choose? To answer this second question, in place of the certainty 
that scientists in general were warranted in having in each constraint at the time, we may 
instead consider the certainty of a particular historical actor, ignoring the normative question 
of whether this certainty was justified given the contemporary state of knowledge. Thus, the 
heuristic that considers the most informative constraints first can also be applied to individual 
methodological choices. 
 
6. Denouement: explaining Pauling’s and Watson and Crick’s successes 
 I began this paper by citing a difference in approach to molecular structure 
determination between Pauling and Watson and Crick on the one hand and Bragg’s group 
and Franklin on the other: the former adopted a synthetic approach, building structure up 
from component-level constraints, whereas the latter opted for an analytic one, deriving 
structure from X-ray diffraction photographs. I then described two alternative heuristics, the 
components-first and photos-first heuristics, and argued that the former was more efficient 
than the latter, and thus its use would increase one’s probability of success. Although the 
primary aim of this paper is normative, I will now turn to a related, descriptive question: can 
the synthetic and analytic approaches adopted by the historical actors be understood as 
exemplifying the components-first and photos-first heuristics respectively? And if so, can 
Pauling’s and Watson and Crick’s successes be, at least in part, attributed to their having 
adopted the heuristic likeliest to generate the correct structure in the shortest period of time? 
Although a comprehensive answer to this question would require a depth of historical 
analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to at least gesture toward why I 
think it is yes.  
Schindler (2008) has argued convincingly that, contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, 
Pauling, and later Watson and Crick, largely ignored direct empirical evidence – that is, X-
ray diffraction photographs – for the structures of protein and DNA respectively. They 
instead focused almost exclusively on building models based on known bond types, lengths, 
and angles, ensuring that these models satisfied stereochemical considerations. This model-
building approach can be understood as a particular instantiation of the components-first 
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heuristic, which provided a concrete way to prioritize component-level constraints in 
scientists’ reasoning.16 In contrast, Bragg’s group and Franklin were skeptical of the model-
building approach, instead prioritizing X-ray diffraction evidence in their search for structure. 
Schindler shows that both Pauling and Watson and Crick generally took into consideration 
component-level constraints first, building models on their basis, and comparing them with 
X-ray diffraction photographs afterwards. In contrast, Bragg’s group and Franklin both began 
by analyzing X-ray diffraction photographs, checking their results against stereochemical 
constraints only thereafter. Here I restrict my attention to Schindler’s argument for the DNA 
case, although the argument for the protein case is similar.  
 Schindler synthesizes historians’ accounts of the discovery of DNA with historical 
actors’ autobiographical recollections of their research during this period.17 He contrasts 
Watson and Crick’s model-building strategy with Franklin’s attempt to derive the structure of 
DNA from her X-ray diffraction photographs (Schindler 2008, pp. 630–33). Schindler cites 
Crick describing his and Watson’s approach as follows: 
 
What Pauling did show us was that exact and careful model building could 
embody constraints that the final answer had in any case to satisfy. 
Sometimes this could lead to the correct structure, using only a minimum of 
the direct experimental [X-ray] evidence (Crick 1988, p. 60, cited in 
Schindler 2008, p. 632; Schindler’s emphasis). 
 
According to Crick, then, scientists were so confident in component-level constraints that the 
correct structure “had” to satisfy these constraints.  
Crick also recognized that X-ray diffraction photos could be misleading: 
  
There’s a perfectly sound reason – it isn’t just aesthetics or because we 
thought it was a nice game – why you should use the minimum of 
experimental evidence. The fact is, you remember, that we knew that Bragg 
and Kendrew and Perutz had been misled by the experimental evidence. And 
therefore every bit of experimental evidence we had got at any one time we 
were prepared to throw away, because we said it may be misleading just the 
way that 5.1 reflection in alpha keratin was misleading […] The point is that 
																																																						
16 In fact, I have argued elsewhere that model-building further contributed to the efficiency of the components-
first strategy. Because bond lengths and angles were physically instantiated in the pieces from which models 
were constructed, they were automatically prioritized; scientists using these models could not help but be 
constrained by them first. Moreover, model-building served as a cognitive aid, helping scientists to more 
quickly eliminate possible structures (Bolinska 2015). 
17 The two most prominent histories of these cases are Judson (1996) and Olby (1974). Other histories have 
more specific focuses: Thomas (1995) on Pauling’s work, Hall (2014) on Astbury, and Maddox (2002) and 
Sayre (1975) on Franklin. For autobiographical accounts, see Watson (1968, 1980), Crick (1988), Wilkins 
(2003), and Pauling (1970).  
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evidence can be unreliable, and therefore you should use as little of it as you 
can. (Crick, quoted in Judson (1996); original emphasis). 
 
 
Since the structure had to satisfy component-level constraints, while X-ray diffraction 
photographs could be misleading, it made sense to begin by constructing a model that 
satisfied these constraints, consulting diffraction photos only thereafter.  
Crick contrasts his and Watson’s approach with how Franklin and Maurice Wilkins, 
also at King’s College, worked:18 
 
The King’s workers were reluctant to be converted to such an approach. 
Rosalind [Franklin], in particular, wanted to use her experimental data as 
fully as possible. I think she thought that to guess the structure by trying 
various models, using a minimum of experimental facts, was too flashy 
(Crick 1988, p. 60, cited in Schindler 2008, pp. 632–33).  
 
 
Wilkins concurs: 
 
Our main mistake was to pay too much attention to experimental evidence. 
Nelson won the battle of Copenhagen by putting his blind eye to the 
telescope so that he did not see the signal to stop fighting. In the same way, 
scientists sometimes should use the Nelson Principle and ignore 
experimental evidence (Wilkins 2003, p. 166, cited in Schindler 2008, p. 
633; Schindler’s emphasis). 
 
I encouraged Bruce Fraser, in our lab, to try out his ideas in a model. 
Rosalind dismissed our excitement by saying that model-building is what 
you do after you have found the structure (Wilkins 2003, p. 160, cited in 
Schindler 2008, p. 632; Schindler’s emphasis). 
 
 
According to PhD student Raymond Gosling, Franklin’s collaborator, Franklin reasoned that 
the synthetic, model-building approach would be akin to “speculation;” in contrast, using 
their analytic approach, they could “let the spots on this photograph tell [them] what the 
structure is.” (Gosling, quoted in Judson (1996, p. 127), my emphasis). Thus, whereas 
Watson and Crick generally applied component-level constraints first, Franklin took them 
into account only after giving full consideration to her X-ray diffraction photographs. That is, 
																																																						
18 Franklin and Wilkins had a notoriously strained relationship. Thus, although they were both at King’s, they 
did not collaborate closely.  
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Watson and Crick, but not Franklin, adopted what I have argued was the most cost-effective 
heuristic for determining the structure of DNA.  
If this is right, can Watson and Crick’s adoption of this heuristic explain their 
success? Developing an understanding of why a historical episode occurred the way it did is 
difficult. Numerous overlapping and complex factors contribute to the particular ways in 
which events unfold. These factors cannot always be identified, teased apart, or simplified, 
and counterfactual reasoning supporting the dominance of one causal explanation over 
another is necessarily defeasible. With this in mind, we may understand Watson and Crick’s 
having used the components-first heuristic, while Franklin adopted the photos-first one, to 
provide the following sort of explanation for their success. Having adopted a heuristic that 
was more cost-effective than Franklin’s, Watson and Crick were more likely to solve the 
structure of DNA before her. The fact that they did indeed solve this structure first does not 
of course prove that their use of this heuristic was responsible for their success. Perhaps they 
made fewer mistakes in their reasoning than did Franklin, maybe social factors such as a 
strained relationship with Wilkins or being a woman in a male-dominated field significantly 
disadvantaged Franklin, or perhaps Watson and Crick just got lucky. But given that Watson 
and Crick’s having adopted this heuristic increased the likelihood of their success, we may 
consider their adoption of this heuristic, together with other proposals, a defeasible 
explanation for it. This does not undermine other possible explanations, which are all 
compatible with this one. For instance, even if a misogynistic climate and a strained 
relationship with Wilkins imposed structural constraints that severely restricted what Franklin 
was able to accomplish,19 her having adopted a less cost-effective heuristic might have 
further impeded her progress. Thus, adding this as an additional defeasible explanation 
enriches our understanding of this significant historical episode.  
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